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Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of
national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three
different groups—the Committee on Capital Market Regulation,1 the
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st
Century,2 and McKinsey & Company.3 Each of the reports focuses on a
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1.
COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim
_ReportREV2.pdf. The Committee is sometimes referred to as the “Paulson Committee,”
reflecting the name of its onetime chair, Henry M. Paulson. Paulson, former Chairman of
Goldman Sachs, was the major stimulus for the Committee’s formation and the direction of its
efforts, but withdrew from the Committee upon being appointed U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
2.
COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2007)
[hereinafter
CHAMBER
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com (under “March 2007” heading, select “Download the
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single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S.
capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets.
While the reports target multiple regulatory forces in their calls for
reform, each report singles out securities class actions as one of the
prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive
disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant
changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly,
these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the
not-too-distant past.
Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).4 Among
the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which
the court chooses a lead plaintiff for the class.5 The statute commands
that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a
consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed
to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the “lead plaintiff” provision
supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s
plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness the plaintiff’s
economic self-interest for the suit’s prosecution. Also, by eliminating
the race to file first, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair
trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel, which Congress
believed too frequently gave rise to weak causes of action surviving
the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 6 The PSLRA also introduced for
full report”). This Commission is identified as “An Independent, Bipartisan Commission
Established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.” Id.
3.
MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP (2007) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT], available at http://www.schumer.
senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf.
At
the request of New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles E.
Schumer, the New York Economic Development Corporation commissioned the consulting group,
McKinsey and Company, to prepare a report in order to provide a better understanding of the
contribution the financial services industry makes to the economy and the forces that contribute
to vibrant, competitive financial markets.
4.
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (codified in scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
5.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(i)(I)-(II), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(i)(I)-(II)
(2000) (providing that within twenty days after filing of complaint, notice shall be published
inviting class members to petition the court to be designated as the suit’s lead plaintiff, and
according sixty days for such petitions to be submitted).
6.
This abuse is complemented by the PSLRA’s alteration of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to mandate that the presiding judge in all securities cases determine whether
sanctions against any of the parties or their representatives should be imposed. See id. § 78u4(c)(1)-(2). The PSLRA’s innovation removes from the litigants themselves the initiative for
imposing sanctions. The rationale for this move was that prior to the PSLRA, in the course of
settlement, dynamics frequently caused parties involved to relinquish quietly their right to move
for Rule 11 sanctions. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 521-23 (1997) (concluding that the PSLRA reforms overall, including the
alteration of the mechanism for Rule 11 sanctions to be considered, was part of Congress’s focus
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securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement,7 as well as
a bar to the plaintiff from obtaining any discovery prior to the district
court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss.8 By introducing
the requirement that allegations involving fraud not only must be pled
with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong
inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside—albeit only for securities
actions—the less demanding notice pleading requirement that has
been a fixture of U.S. civil procedure for decades.9
The PSLRA also introduced substantive changes to the law.
With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced with
proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is
capped by the defendant’s relative degree of fault. 10 Similarly,
contribution rights among co-violators are also based on the
proportionate fault of each defendant.11 Three years after passing the
PSLRA, Congress returned to the subject of abusive securities class
actions by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(“SLUSA”). 12 This law was prompted by the aggressive efforts of
plaintiffs’ lawyers to bypass PSLRA limitations—most notably the bar
to discovery and higher pleading requirement—by bringing suit in
state court. 13 Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are
exclusively the domain of the federal court.

that the presiding courts are to become more aggressive in their supervision of securities class
actions).
7.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring the plaintiff to “state with a particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”). This
section was recently interpreted to mean that a “strong inference” is one that is “powerful or
cogent” and is to be determined from all the facts set forth in the complaint, with inferences
being drawn both for and against the allegations. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007). See generally James D. Cox et al., Does the Pleading Standard
Matter in Securities Class Actions? Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of the Likely Impact of
Tellabs (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (concluding that divergent
interpretations of pleading standard that persisted before Tellabs likely will continue).
8.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
9.
What is typically required is “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957),
overruled on other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (explaining
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits, not to introduce “a
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive”).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f). Proportionate liability does not apply, however, in some instances,
such as when there has been an adjudication of knowledge of the violation.
11. Id. § 78u-4(f)(8).
12. Id. § 78bb(f)(1).
13. See generally Richard Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998). However, SLUSA
preempts even claims that could not have been brought under the federal securities laws, such as
those brought by non-purchasers or non-sellers of securities. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

COX-THOMAS_PAGE

358

3/25/2008 9:37:45 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:355

In this Article, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and, more
particularly, the impact of the type of lead plaintiff on the size of
settlements in securities fraud class actions. We provide insight into
whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the
overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia
that may explain why some suits settle for sums that are extremely
small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, to the
asset size of the defendant-company, and to other settlements in our
sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.”
Part I of this Article sets forth the contemporary debate
surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In
this Section, we present the insights advanced in the three prominent
reports mentioned above, which focus on the competitiveness of U.S.
capital markets. In Part II, we first provide descriptive statistics of
our extensive data set and then use multivariate regression analysis
to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely
examine small settlements for clues as to whether they reflect
evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy
recommendations based on our analysis of the data.
Our goals in this Article are more modest than the Committee
Report, the Chamber Report, and the McKinsey Report, each of which
called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed
securities fraud settlements in order to determine whether the
reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s
important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think that it
was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further
cutbacks in private securities class actions so soon after the Act was
passed.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS
A. Recent Calls for Reform
The premise of each of the three reports is that U.S. capital
markets are losing, or have lost, their competitive edge over rival
markets, most notably the London Stock Exchange. The metrics
advanced to support the thesis are quite similar across the three
reports. For example, the Committee Report emphasized the widely
Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87-89 (2006) (sweeping into SLUSA claims that
misrepresentations caused class members to retain their shares).
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reported news account that twenty-four of the twenty-five largest
initial public offerings (“IPOs”) in 2006 took place in markets outside
the United States. 14 Indeed, the Committee Report tracks a fairly
steady decline in global IPOs occurring within the United States.15 On
this point, the McKinsey Report notes that global IPOs taking place in
the United States in 2006 were barely one-third the level they were in
2001, while European exchanges saw a thirty-percent increase during
this same period.16 The most notable gainers have been the London
markets, which have seen their percentage of global IPOs increase
18.2 percent over the past six years compared to 11.4 percent in the
United States.17
Echoing these concerns,18 the Chamber Report notes the steady
decline since 1996 in the number of foreign companies choosing to list
their securities in the United States, so that the U.S. market share of
worldwide listings has decreased nineteen percent since 1997.19 And
the McKinsey Report reflects where many of these IPOs are
migrating—to Hong Kong, Singapore, and London.20 At the same time,
the Chamber Report observes that, on close analysis during the first
half of 2006, there were seventeen foreign issuers who could consider
an IPO in the United States. Of those, eleven chose the United States,
demonstrating that “the competitive position of the United States for
in-play IPOs has not dramatically deteriorated . . . .”21 Singled out for
special treatment is the relative attractiveness of London’s Alternative
Investment Market (“AIM”), which is the quintessential regulation-lite
market. Since 2001, 870 companies have listed on the AIM, compared
to 526 on the NASDAQ market, and the trend has accelerated, with

14. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (noting, as well, that nine of the ten largest
IPOs of 2006 prior to the report’s release occurred outside the United States).
15. See id. at 30 fig.I.6 (reflecting graphically the decline from fifty percent by value of IPOs
occurring in the United States in 2000 to about eight percent in 2006).
16. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 43.
17. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC
EQUITY
MARKET
7
(2007),
available
at
http://www.capmktsreg.
org/pdfs/The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf (detailing the slide in
worldwide percentage of IPOs listed in the United States, the growth in the London markets
against the world markets through 2006, and the steady increase in market share for IPOs in
markets outside of the United States and London).
18. See, e.g., CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19.
19. Id. at 19.
20. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 47 Exhibit 10 (reporting post-2002 percent of IPO
values holding steady at about ten percent across four exchange markets within the United
States, but rising in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London).
21. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
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the AIM enjoying more than twice as many new listings as the
NASDAQ since 2005.22
The Committee Report advances a more interesting line of
inquiry by considering the forces driving the growing “private equity”
market.23 In this type of market, funds raised from institutions and
wealthy individuals are employed skillfully in order to take public
companies private or acquire private companies that otherwise would
have considered public markets as the next step in their development.
While in the past, investors reaped their gains when the private
company ultimately undertook an IPO, the Committee Report points
out that, since 2001, the numbers of private sales exits exceed the
number of IPO exits by ten to one.24 Others have suggested that, in
addition to the cost related to the greater transparency of being a
public company,25 another consideration for being a private firm is the
heightened exposure to litigation related to the disclosures that public
companies must make. This is reflected in the data gathered in the
McKinsey Report, in which surveyed executives stated that “the
propensity toward litigation was the predominant problem” with the
legal system.26
Although each of the three reports credits securities class
actions with contributing to the growing anti-competitiveness of U.S.
capital markets, they disagree as to the appropriate remedy. The
least-sweeping suggestions appear in the Chamber Report’s first
recommendation that any recovery in a private suit should take into
consideration sums recovered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) pursuant to its authority under Section 308 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”).27 This provision permits the SEC to
direct to injured parties any monies recovered from fines and

22. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 50 (pointing out that during the first ten months of
2006, total IPOs listed on Nasdaq raised about the same amount as IPOs listed on AIM, whereas
as recent as 2004, IPOs listed on Nasdaq raised about four times the amount as those listed on
AIM).
23. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-38.
24. Id. at 36 (reporting that in terms of value, the private equity exits from 2001 to 2005
totaled $94.85 billion compared to $12.06 billion for IPO exits).
25. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 26 (referencing a study that explored the effects of
increased regulation costs from SOX, Ehud Kamar et al., Going Private Decisions and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org.
Research Papers, Paper No. C06-5, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=901769).
26. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 75. For example, sixty-three percent of respondents
thought the United Kingdom had a less litigious culture compared to seventeen percent who felt
the United States had a less litigious culture. Id.
27. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 88-90.
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accompanying disgorgement remedies.28 The SEC has used this “Fair
Fund” authority frequently since the enactment of SOX; the frequency
of its use and the considerable sums sometimes directed to the Fair
Fund are unlikely to have been overlooked by litigants. Indeed, any
private settlement following such action by the SEC most assuredly
was negotiated in the shadow of earlier SEC Fair Fund awards.
What appears to be lurking behind this proposal is the
observation that:
From time to time, there is a case in which a private action is proceeding ahead of an
SEC enforcement action. In these relatively infrequent situations, the Commission
recommends that the SEC consider whether seeking postponement of the completion of
the private settlement until after a Fair Fund is established would be beneficial . . . .29

Our own investigation of settlements reveals that parallel SEC
investigations and enforcement actions arise in only about seventeen
percent of the private settlements included in our study data. We
suspect that, in the great majority of these cases, the SEC action is
concluded before the private action is settled. Thus, the Chamber
Report’s recommendation cannot be expected to have an important
impact on the overall conduct of securities class actions.
More
importantly,
the
Chamber
Report’s
second
recommendation for reforming private litigation is that the scope of
the definition of who can be a primary violator should not be expanded
beyond the very conservative “bright-line” test adopted by the Second
Circuit.30 An understanding of this recommendation begins with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank.31 The Court rejected aiding and abetting liability, holding that
only those who “make” a false representation or “engage” in a
manipulative act can be liable under the antifraud provision.32 After
Central Bank, courts have grappled with the question of just how
remote a party can be from the misrepresentation and still be liable.
The most liberal construction of this inquiry is that which includes all
who participate in a “scheme” to defraud as liable parties. 33 In
contrast, the bright-line test holds responsible only those to whom the

28. Id.
29. Id. at 89.
30. Id. at 90-92.
31. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
32. Id. at 177-78.
33. See, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that those who participate in “sham” transactions known to be carried out for the
purpose of facilitating the release of false financial reports are primary participants), vacated
and remanded, Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., No. 06-560, 2008 WL
169406 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2008).
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plaintiff can attribute the false statement, so a defendant who is not
identified with the false representation but who has contributed
mightily to it is excused of liability.34 Some greater clarity in this area
was hoped for when the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether
“scheme” liability exists after Central Bank.35 The Court’s decision in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, 36 however, provides no greater
specification as to the contours for determining who is a primary
participant. Nonetheless, its distinctly anti-private-suit rhetoric is
sure to impact the lower courts.
Reflecting the concerns that arose with the disappearance of
Big Five accounting firm, Arthur Anderson, the Chamber Report joins
the other reports in recognizing the need for serious consideration of
capping auditor liability37—the fear is that a settlement or judgment
of a significant sum could well cause a further thinning in the ranks of
public accounting firms. To address this fear, the Chamber Report
recommends that auditors be permitted to enter into binding
arbitration clauses, so as to reduce the cost of litigation and
presumably to provide a more cost-effective means for auditors to
manage their litigation risks.38
The reforms recommended in the McKinsey Report call for the
SEC to use its rulemaking power to limit liability of foreign companies
“to securities-related damages that are proportional to their degree of
exposure to the U.S. Markets.” 39 Presumably this would exclude
recovery by foreign investors for losses suffered in connection with
declines in the issuer’s home market.40 The McKinsey Report, similar
to the Chamber Report, embraces a cap on auditor liability.41 Its most
novel and pervasive recommendation is to permit parties to appeal
interlocutory judgments immediately.42 Finally, the McKinsey Report

34. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that an accounting firm that allegedly assured a company of the accuracy of certain financial
information, despite knowledge to the contrary, was not a primary participant because it was not
identified in the publication of the information).
35. See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting scheme liability), cert. granted sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007).
36. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43, 2008 WL 123801
(U.S. Jan. 15, 2008).
37. CHAMBER REPORT, supra note 2, at 107-08.
38. Id. at 114.
39. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 102.
40. See id. (stating that “aggrieved plaintiffs” should still be able “to recover warranted
damages”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 104.
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calls for express authority allowing company charters to require the
arbitration of shareholder claims.43
The recommendations of the Committee Report are far
reaching. The Committee Report calls on the SEC to eliminate
through rulemaking numerous doctrinal uncertainties that surround
the scope of the anti-fraud provision.44 These areas of uncertainty are
broadly identified as “materiality,” “scienter,” and “reliance.” For
example, the report identifies an existing circuit split regarding
whether a fact, omitted or misstated initially, can be material if the
announcement containing the omission or misstatement is
accompanied by no detectable market response. Similarly, the
Committee Report points to a circuit split regarding whether the
pleading standard permits an allegation of recklessness to create a
strong inference of fraud and calls for SEC clarification. The SEC also
is asked to clarify the scope of the “fraud on the market” theory for
establishing reliance, whereby a class of plaintiffs can rely generally
on the integrity of the market rather than proving reliance on the
misrepresentation itself. Similar to the Chamber Report’s concern, the
Committee Report argues that “private damage awards should be
offset by any Fair Funds collections” obtained by the SEC. The
Committee Report also favors prohibiting attorneys from representing
plaintiffs in securities class actions where the attorney directly or
indirectly has contributed funds to the election campaign of the
officials responsible for an investor’s (i.e., fund’s) decision to become a
lead plaintiff.
In the audit area, fearing the disappearance of another major
accounting firm, the Committee Report recommends a cap on the
liability of auditors.45 In response to the WorldCom litigation result,
the Committee Report further recommends that good faith reliance by
outside directors on audited financial statements be conclusive
evidence of their due diligence, so that no section 11 liability will be
imposed on the relying directors if the financial statements are
materially misleading.46 In WorldCom, 47 directors failed to have the
case against them dismissed, 48 even though misrepresentations
appeared in the audited financial statements for which the outside
43. Id. at 103.
44. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 80 (calling for the SEC to undertake a review of
the elements of Rule 10b-5 using a “risk based” approach). For the relevant recommendations by
the Committee, see id. at 80-84.
45. Id. at 88-89.
46. Id. at 91.
47. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
48. Id. at 635.
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directors would be liable only if they failed to establish that they “had
no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe” the financial
statements were misleading. 49 The court concluded that it was a
question of fact whether the directors’ awareness that WorldCom
enjoyed one of the most positive ratios of expenses to revenues was a
“red flag” that would deprive the directors of this defense.50
The most sweeping litigation reform proposed in the
Committee Report calls for permitting public companies to opt out of
the current court-based litigation system if their charters provide that
shareholder disputes be addressed via some alternative dispute
resolution procedure, such as arbitration. 51 The parallel for this
approach is what has occurred in the realm of customer-broker
disputes, which, since embraced by the Supreme Court,52 largely have
ridded the federal court system of such disputes, substituting in their
place the NASD-supervised arbitration process.53 Implementation of
this recommendation likely would require the SEC to set aside its
earlier position that substituting an ADR process for court-based
litigation violates the securities laws anti-waiver provisions. 54
However, even if the SEC does retreat from such a view, any ADR
clause most certainly would face a serious challenge premised on the
argument that the anti-waiver protections are personal and, therefore,
cannot be set aside by the collective will of a majority of a company’s
shareholders.
Whether examined collectively or in isolation, the reforms
proposed by the three reports do not suggest wholesale indictment of
securities class actions. With the exception of the Committee Report’s
calls for the SEC to undertake rulemaking to clarify issues involving
materiality, scienter, and reliance and its recommendation that public
companies be able to opt for ADR procedures, the proposals are hardly
an indictment of the efficacy of the securities class action. Indeed,

49. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (2000).
50. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4193, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005) (holding that directors cannot rely on certified financial
statements if there are red flags giving notice that such reliance is unwarranted).
51. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 109-12.
52. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987) (recognizing
arbitration of Exchange Act customer complaints against brokers); see also Rodriquez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (overruling earlier precedent, Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), to permit arbitration of Securities Act customer claims against
brokers).
53. For a study of inconsistencies of recent arbitration decisions with underlying legal
principles, see Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order To
Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005).
54. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 111.
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none of the reports include any of the claims commonly made in the
mid-nineties by proponents of the PSLRA that securities fraud actions
were, on average, extortion devices in the hands of unscrupulous
attorneys. 55 Rather, each report is thin on data capturing problems
that exist with contemporary securities class actions. Thus, if we were
to consider only the contemporary reform proposals, we might well
conclude that securities class actions are working reasonably well and
are only in need of some minor tweaking. We seek to address
empirically several questions that we believe are central to assessing
whether reform of the securities class action is justified.
B. Tensions Surrounding the Lead Plaintiff Provision
Congress placed the plaintiff’s selection at a strategic position
in its 1995 reform efforts. The goal was to provide, whenever possible,
the suit with a real plaintiff whose economic self-interest would serve
the class and likely the defendant corporation’s interests. The latter
could occur by structuring any resulting settlement to include
governance reforms that would benefit the defendant company’s
stockholders in the years following the settlement. It also is possible
that the vigilance of a significant holder of the defendant company’s
shares would recommend to the court that the suit was improvidently
filed. The former could occur in many ways, such as the lead plaintiff
prevailing on the class’s counsel to obtain a larger settlement than the
class’s counsel otherwise would have pursued and negotiating
attorneys’ fees that not only provide incentives for the counsel to reap
a large settlement but also lower the fees from what otherwise would
be awarded.
The plaintiffs’ law firms are not passive participants in the
operation of the lead plaintiff provision. The PSLRA empowers the
lead plaintiff to recommend to the court who should be designated as
counsel for the class.56 In this way, the decision of selecting the suit’s

55. Testimony during the hearings preceding the passage of the PSLRA sometimes
emphasized the extortionate nature of securities class actions. See, e.g., Private Litigation Under
the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 12 (1993) (statement of Edward R.
McCracken, President and CEO, Silicon Graphics) (noting that securities class actions frequently
are filed upon a momentary price decline of ten percent or more and often result in a recovery of
attorneys fees, but little else). Some commentators express similar skepticism. See, e.g., Joseph
A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 742-43 (1995) (concluding that, among
studied settlements, less than one fourth yielded settlements below $2 million, with an average
of these settlements being about $1 million, such that “settlement values may often be less than
avoided litigation costs”).
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(v), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2000).
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lead plaintiff ultimately decides who will be the suit’s counsel. It is,
therefore, understandable that, since 1995, plaintiffs’ firms actively
have recruited, and nurtured ongoing relationships with, institutional
investors with an eye toward gaining their support in being chosen to
represent the class.
The PSLRA is clear that the lead plaintiff is presumed to be
the party with the most significant loss as a consequence of the
violation being litigated.57 A review of the legislative history reveals
that Congress’s vision was focused exclusively on this party being an
institutional investor.58 As the following descriptive statistics reveal,
this vision has not been fulfilled, as the greatest number of securities
class action settlements have as their plaintiff either an individual or
a group of individuals, but not a financial institution. On a more
hopeful note, we do find that in recent years there have been many
more cases where a financial institution or other entity is the suit’s
lead plaintiff. We speculate that, as experience was gained under the
lead plaintiff provision, uncertainties regarding the costs and benefits
of being a lead plaintiff disappeared, resulting in many more
organizations willing to shoulder the task of being the suit’s lead
plaintiff.
Initially, institutional lead plaintiffs were a narrowly defined
group, being almost entirely composed of public pension funds or labor
pension funds. Over time, this group expanded to include other
financial institutions, such as insurance companies, private
investment entities including hedge funds, and, sporadically, mutual
funds. There is a continuing practice of permitting groups of
individuals to aggregate their claims, particularly when they share a
pre-existing relationship. Serious doubts have been raised regarding
whether aggregation is consistent with the PSLRA goal of providing a
watchful and resourceful plaintiff for the suit. 59 These doubts stem

57. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that petitioner
with “largest financial interest in the relief” is to be appointed lead plaintiff). The theory behind
the presumption is developed in Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions,
104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2088-94 (1995) (detailing agency problems that can arise in class actions
that lack a plaintiff with a sufficient economic interest in the suit’s prosecution).
58. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
(repeatedly making references to expectations that “institutional investors” will step forward to
become lead plaintiffs).
59. See, e.g., R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional
Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1218-19 (1999)
(asserting that “aggregation shifts control of securities fraud litigation from investors to their
attorneys and . . . makes it less likely that institutional investors will be appointed as lead
plaintiffs”).
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from the concern that groups face serious collective action problems
and the belief that the incentives to be watchful are no greater than
those of the group’s member with the largest loss. Rounding out the
range of lead plaintiffs are individuals, who, as observed earlier,
represent the largest percentage of securities class actions.
In this empirical investigation, we have two foci. First, we seek
to better understand how well the lead plaintiff provision is operating.
As discussed earlier, a key provision of the PSLRA was the adoption of
a mechanism for the court to select the most adequate representative
of the class. We expand on our earlier work on the operation of this
provision by including in our analysis a substantial number of cases
filed in more recent years. The more recent settlements are significant
to understanding today’s securities class action; our data reflects that
it took several years for the lead plaintiff provision to attract large
numbers of competing petitioners. To this end, we compare
institutional lead plaintiff cases initiated prior to 2002 with those
initiated after 2001. By undertaking this bifurcation, we capture how
the experience with this type of lead plaintiff has impacted
settlements. Moreover, in this study, we seek to differentiate more
closely among the types of entities that are selected as lead plaintiffs.
Our second focus is to understand better the dynamics and
variables associated with the “small settlement.” These are
settlements that yield amounts not exceeding $2 million or $3 million,
which in our sample represent 20.5 percent and 29.7 percent of the
total number of settlements, respectively. In this part of the Article,
we address the claim that securities class actions frequently involve
“strike suits,” which are baseless actions sought for no greater purpose
than to extort a settlement, most of which is diverted to the suit’s
attorneys. In the end, our analysis of 773 settlements suggests several
areas of inquiry that regulators and policymakers should consider if
any review of securities class actions is to occur. Our analysis and
recommendations are intended to contribute to the ongoing debate
about how securities class actions serve their compensatory mission.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS’ IMPACT IN SECURITIES
FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
We begin by presenting some descriptive statistics for our
sample and the main variables for which we have complete data. The
data sample consists of 773 securities class actions settled from 1993
through 2005. Pacer was our main source of information regarding the
specific cases, such as the identity of the lead plaintiff, the filing and
settlement dates, and the settlement amount. We used the SEC
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Enforcement Releases and the Nexis electronic data base to ascertain
whether there was a parallel SEC enforcement proceeding. For each
case, we coded the lead plaintiff type. We are especially interested in
institutional lead plaintiffs defined as financial institutions in the
classic sense of an insurance company, bank, pension fund, mutual
fund, endowment, or foundation. The institutional lead plaintiffs in
our cases are mostly pension funds, either public pension funds or
labor union pension funds. To examine their separate influence on
securities settlement outcomes, we separate these types of institutions
from a residual sub-group of “other institutions.”
In addition, we obtained information on the defendant firms’
total assets (a proxy for the defendants’ sizes) immediately before the
law suits from COMPUSTAT and any bankruptcy filings by the
defendants before case settlement from the Bankruptcy Research
Database maintained by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki of UCLA Law
School.
Our study required an estimation of provable losses suffered by
the plaintiffs during class periods. These numbers were calculated in
the same manner as in Cox & Thomas (2004).60 The provable loss ratio
variable was calculated by scaling the actual cash settlements with
the estimated provable losses.
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 sets forth the descriptive statistics for the sample used
in our empirical analysis. Categories 1 and 3 comprise our
institutional investor lead plaintiffs. They figure prominently in the
sample as there are 113 settlements (17.9 percent of post-PSLRA
settlements) that involve either an institution, or an institution and
an individual, as the lead plaintiffs. The largest category of lead
plaintiffs is the “Group of Individuals” classification. These constitute
aggregations of individual lead plaintiffs that are selected collectively
to lead the class. Single individuals and other types of entities are the
remaining two important lead plaintiff categories. There is no lead
plaintiff for the pre-PSLRA cases.

60. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 768 n.100 (2003) (calculating provable losses using the
damage estimation model).
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The second half of Table 1 provides a breakdown of the year the
complaint was filed for all of the cases in our sample. About one-fifth
of our cases were filed before the enactment of the PSLRA, about
three-fifths were filed during the early post-PSLRA period, and the
remaining cases were filed after 2001 in what we refer to as the
mature post-PSLRA timeframe. The broad diversity in our sample
permits us to examine changes that may have occurred in settlements
and other aspects of securities fraud class action litigation over this
extended timeframe. In particular, we can examine longitudinally any
differences in institutional investor activity and effect.
To understand better what type of institutional investors are
involved as lead plaintiffs in the cases in our sample, Table 1A
subdivides this group of institutional lead plaintiffs into three
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categories: labor union pension funds, public pension funds, and the
remaining institutions. We make this division in order to highlight
any differences in behavior among these groups. Prior research has
found some differences.61

In Table 2, we examine settlement amounts by type of lead
plaintiff. Settlement size is the best measure of the benefits of the case
to the plaintiff class. While there is some controversy over whether the
current measure of damages leads to a “circularity” problem, 62 the
beneficiaries of the settlement almost always would prefer larger
settlements to smaller ones. The largest settlements arise in cases
with institutional investor lead plaintiffs. For this group of
settlements, we observe much larger mean and median levels than for
any of the other lead plaintiff groups. Public pension funds have by far
the largest mean recoveries, but their median recovery is lower than
that of the labor union pension fund category. Single individual lead
plaintiffs achieve the smallest settlement sizes. Significance tests
suggest that both the difference in the mean and in the median
between institutions and individuals are significant at the five-percent
level, and that the difference between the mean for public pension
funds and the mean for other types of institutions is also significant at
61. Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of
Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 3 (St. John’s Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722.
62. See ANJAN V. THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY, U.S. CHAMBER
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1
(2005), available at http://heartland.temp.siteexecutive.com/pdf/18331.pdf (finding that, due to
significant holdings of public companies by well-diversified investors, securities class actions
produce net benefits to investors in mergers and initial public offering settings, but not
otherwise).

COX-THOMAS_PAGE

2008]

3/25/2008 9:37:45 AM

SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

371

the five-percent level. On the other hand, the difference in the median
between public pension funds and labor union pension funds is not
significant.63

Table 3 reports the length of the class period for cases in our
sample by type of lead plaintiff. The length of the class period is a
proxy for the number of defrauded investors: a longer class period
generally means that more investors were harmed. 64 We see that
63. p-values for the t-statistics for testing equivalence in the mean between institutional
lead plaintiffs and individual lead plaintiffs, and between institutional lead plaintiffs and groups
of individual lead plaintiffs, are both 0.02. The p-value for the t-test for testing equivalence in the
mean between public pension funds and labor union pension funds is 0.0001. All of these
statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of equal mean. p-values in the Wilcoxon rank sum
test are both <.0001 between institutional lead plaintiffs and individual lead plaintiffs, and
between institutional lead plaintiffs and groups of individuals, and the p-value between public
pension funds and labor union pension funds is 0.35.
64. The class period spans the time from the occurrence of the defendant’s illegal activity,
which induced response from investors up to when the illegality of the activity was revealed to
the public. Thus, only investors who bought shares during this period are deemed to have been
induced by the defendant’s activity and are able to be members of the class. Therefore, the longer
the class period, the larger the number of investors deemed to have been induced, and thus
harmed, by the defendant’s activity. Harm is evidenced by the stock market drop after the
revelation of the defendant’s illegal conduct.
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settlements pursued by institutional lead plaintiffs have the longest
class periods, although public pension funds have the lowest mean and
median class period length of any of the institutional groups. This
difference may reflect that public pension funds, more so than other
categories of lead plaintiffs, cherry-pick the cases in which they seek
to become lead plaintiffs, but we cannot be sure that this is the case.
There are relatively minor variations among the other types of lead
plaintiffs. Significance tests have confirmed these observations.65

Using total assets (in millions of dollars) as a proxy for firm
size, Table 4 presents data on the size of the defendant firms in our
sample cases. Firm size may be important as a determinant of how
much a defendant can afford to pay in damages in a settlement, as
well as the magnitude of the losses caused by its reporting violation.
65. The differences in the mean class periods between labor union pension funds and
individual lead plaintiffs and between labor union pension funds and groups of individuals are
both significant at the five-percent level. The difference between means for labor union pension
funds and public pension funds is significant at the ten-percent level. The difference in the
median between institutions and individual lead plaintiffs (as well as between institutions and
groups of individuals) and the difference between labor union pension funds and public pension
funds are both significant at the five-percent level.
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The most salient fact shown in this table is that institutional lead
plaintiffs (in all categories) assume the lead plaintiff position in cases
with much larger defendants than do other types of lead plaintiffs. We
also see public pension funds are lead plaintiffs in cases against the
largest defendants based on mean values, although not for median
values. Single individuals and groups of individuals appear as lead
plaintiffs in cases against the smallest defendants.66

Using the model that we developed in an earlier paper, we
estimate for each case in our sample the provable losses suffered by
the class members.67 The estimated provable losses are a measure of
66. p-values in the t-test for the equivalence in the mean are: 0.07 between labor union
pension funds and individuals, 0.001 between public pension funds and individuals, 0.02
between other institutions and individuals, 0.02 between labor union pension funds and groups
of individuals, 0.0003 between public pension funds and groups of individuals, and 0.005
between other public institutions and groups of individuals. All of these numbers strongly reject
the null hypothesis of equivalence in the mean. As for the median, the p-values for the Wilcoxon
rank sum test z statistics are <.0001 between each type of institutional lead plaintiff and
individuals, as well as between each type of institutional lead plaintiff and groups of individuals,
again suggesting significant difference in the median. The median between labor union pension
funds and public pension funds is not significant at five percent, with a p-value of 0.28.
67. Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 60.
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the harm suffered by the plaintiff class as a result of the defendants’
alleged fraud. We present these numbers in Table 5. Once again, we
see that institutions appear as lead plaintiffs in cases with the largest
values, although neither labor union funds nor public pension funds
appear in the highest-damage cases on average. Further, we see that
individuals and groups of individuals act as lead plaintiffs in cases
with the lowest estimated provable losses.68

Our final set of descriptive statistics in Table 6 displays the
ratio of the settlement amount to the estimated provable losses for the
cases in our sample. This ratio can be understood as the percentage of
losses recovered by the class. While the overall level of this value
68. Significance tests show that cases in which public pension funds or other institutions
(exclusive of labor union pension funds) were the lead plaintiffs have significantly higher mean
provable losses than cases in which individuals and groups of individuals were. In contrast, the
difference is not significant at five-percent level between labor union pension funds and
individual lead plaintiffs or groups of individuals. The difference between the mean for labor
union pension funds and public pension funds is only significant at ten-percent level. The
differences in the median between each institutional lead plaintiff type and individual lead
plaintiffs, as well as between each institutional lead plaintiff type and groups of individuals, are
highly significant, with p-values <.0001 across the board. The difference between the median of
labor union pension funds and public pension funds is not significant.
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depends heavily on the damage formula and related assumptions used
in calculating provable losses, the relative levels of this number help
us identify differences in lead plaintiffs’ effectiveness. Here we see
that labor union funds and public pension funds are about average in
terms of recovery percentages, while the “Other Institution” category
is a laggard.69

B. Multivariate Analysis
Having described the main variables in the previous section,
we now use multivariate analyses to examine the underlying
relationships between several key variables. We are particularly
interested in the determinants of the size of settlements in securities
fraud litigation. In Table 7, we display the results of a least squares
regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors with the

69. Although the differences in the mean recovery ratio between each type of institution
and individuals (as well as groups of individuals) are not significant, the differences in the
median between these groups are significant at five-percent or ten-percent levels. Among
different institutional lead plaintiff types, labor union pension funds and public pension funds
are shown to have significantly higher medians than other institutions.
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dependent variable being log (settlement amount).70 The independent
variables are log (provable losses), log (total assets), length of class
period, a dummy variable for the presence of an SEC enforcement
action, a bankruptcy dummy variable (to control for the potential
effect of bankruptcy filing on settlement size), and two dummy
variables for whether the case was filed in the 1996-2000 (early postPSLRA) time period or the 2001-2005 (mature post-PSLRA) time
period.
Table 7
Determinants of Log(Settlement Amount)
OLS Regressor
Intercept

Coefficient
3.87

Standard Error***
0.27

Chi-sq
198.03

Pr > ChiSq
<.0001

Log (Provable Loss)

0.34

0.03

99.04**

<.0001

Log (Total Assets)

0.15

0.03

26.64**

<.0001

Log (Class Period)

0.04

0.05

0.88

0.35

SEC Dummy

0.33

0.10

10.40**

0.001

1996 - 2000 Period

-0.05

0.09

0.28

0.60

2001 - 2005 Period

-0.24

0.10

5.62**

0.02

Bankruptcy Dummy
-0.11
0.19
0.34
Adj. R-sq: 0.47
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** Heteroscedasticity-consistent

0.56

Scrutinizing Table 7, we see that provable losses, total assets,
and the presence of an SEC enforcement action are all positively and
significantly related to the size of the settlement, which is consistent
with earlier studies. 71 However, the mature post-PSLRA dummy is
negatively and significantly correlated with settlement size,
suggesting that the dollar size of settlements has decreased in cases

70. If the variance of the log (settlement amount) increases with the size of provable losses,
then an ordinary least squares estimate could suffer from heteroscedasicity problems. We
correct for this potential problem by using heteroscedasticity-constant errors.
71. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter?
An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587,
1630-32 (2006) (finding that provable losses are positively related to the settlement amount, and
that the presence of institutional lead plaintiffs additionally increases the settlement amount, all
other factors held constant).
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filed in the mature post-PSLRA period.72 We also find that class period
length and bankruptcy filing are not significant explanatory variables
for settlement size.73
We next examine the determinants of institutional investors’
decision to intervene as lead plaintiffs in the post-PSLRA period using
a logit model. Earlier research found that prior to 2002, institutions
were more likely to appear in cases with larger estimated provable
losses, at firms with greater total assets, and where the SEC has
undertaken enforcement actions.74 Table 8 presents our results for our
sample, which includes cases filed during the post-2001 time period.

We see that including the later time period does not affect how
institutional investors select their cases: provable losses, the presence
of an SEC enforcement action, and total assets are significant and
positive. Each of these factors indicates that institutions are more
likely to intervene as lead plaintiffs in cases with larger losses, a
government enforcement action, and bigger defendants. However, the
length of the class period is insignificant, although it did yield a
positive sign. In estimations not shown, we find similar results using
the provable loss ratio as the dependent variable and all of the same
independent variables (with the exception of provable losses). We also
try alternative specifications (not shown) of the model to include
dummy variables in the post-2001 time period to see if there are any
72. We test for the significance of the differences in the coefficients between the 1996-2000
period and the 2001-2006 period and find a chi square statistic of 4.47, which is significant at
less than the five-percent level.
73. The absence of significance for bankruptcy filings may stem from the use of D&O
insurance policies as the principal method of funding securities class action settlements.
74. Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 71, at 1630.
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changes in institutional investor behavior during the mature postPSLRA time period, but these additional variables are insignificant.
We turn next to a very important policy question: whether the
presence of an institutional lead plaintiff adds value for the investors
by increasing settlement size. Researchers previously have found that
the presence of an institutional investor does add value for cases filed
prior to 2002.75 In this paper, we examine whether this relationship
persists during the post-2001 time period. Given the much more
widespread appearance of institutional investors in the post-2001 time
period, it is possible that they are no longer adding value. Table 9
displays these new results. In this table, the Institution Dummy
variable indicates the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff. The
New Era Dummy variable captures any effect for post-2001 cases in
general, while the variable Institution*New Era is an interaction term
of the Institution Dummy and the New Era Dummy designed to
capture any additional effect of institutions on settlement amounts in
cases settled after 2001.

We find that the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff
increases settlement size overall and that there is a slight but
insignificant increase in settlement amount in the post-2001 period for
institutional investors. We also see that settlement size is positively
and significantly correlated with estimated provable losses, total

75. Cox & Thomas with Kiku, supra note 71, at 1636; Perino, supra note 61, at 21-25.
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assets, and the presence of an SEC enforcement action. The class
period variable is insignificant, as is the dummy variable for post-2001
settlements overall. 76 Thus, the variables found significant in the
early years of the PSLRA’s enactment continue to be significant more
recently.
We are also interested in learning whether the type of
institutional lead plaintiff matters. In Table 10 below, we include
three different dummy variables, one for each type of institutional
lead plaintiff. As control variables, we continue to include the same
independent variables as in Table 9.

The results show a positive and significant impact on
settlement size from the presence of a public pension fund, or labor
union fund, as lead plaintiff. However, the coefficient on the Public
76. When we run a similar regression using the ratio of settlement amount to provable
losses as our dependent variable, but with the same set of independent variables (except for
provable losses, which is now part of the dependent variable), we find negative and significant
coefficients on the Log(total assets) and class period variables, and a positive and significant
coefficient on the SEC dummy variable. This suggests that cases against larger firms and cases
with a larger number of claimants pay out a small percentage of estimated losses.
Interestingly, none of the institutional investor variables are significant. We explore this
result more fully infra note 77.
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Pension Fund dummy variable is more than twice the size of that on
labor union funds, indicating a greater effect from the presence of
public pension funds. The Other Institutions variable is slightly
negative and insignificant.77
III. SMALL SETTLEMENTS: ARE THEY STRIKE SUITS?
Another important issue for us is whether securities class
action suits are frequently strike suits. We approach this question by
focusing on those cases in our sample that led to small settlements.
We define “small settlements” as cases where the settlement before
deducting any attorneys’ fees or related litigation costs is below $2
million; we also separately consider settlements falling between $2
and $3 million. Table 11 below presents a breakdown of those cases for
our sample.

77. We re-estimate this equation using the provable loss ratio as the dependent variable
and the same set of independent variables (minus provable losses, to avoid problems in the
estimation). We find that the public pension fund variable is positive and significant, the other
pension fund variable is negative and significant, and the labor union pension fund variable is
insignificant. This evidence is consistent with a hypothesis that public pension funds are doing
the best job of increasing the percentage of losses recovered by the class.
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Roughly thirty percent of our sample cases involve cash
settlements below $3 million. By far the largest portion of this group is
cases where the lead plaintiff involves individuals, either singly or in a
group; together, they constitute just over fifty percent of all postPSLRA settlements below $3 million. At the other end of the
spectrum, the Labor Union Pension Fund and Public Pension Fund
lead plaintiff categories show the lowest percentage of small
settlements in the sample. The remaining lead plaintiff types are
fairly tightly grouped in the twenty-to-forty-percent range.
In separate calculations, we examine whether there are any
significant changes in the percentage of cases involving small
settlements for the three time periods we are studying: pre-PSLRA,
early post-PSLRA, and mature post-PSLRA. We see a slight decline in
these percentages from the pre-PSLRA period to the early post-PSLRA
period, followed by a rebound to somewhat higher levels in the mature
post-PSLRA period, but with no obvious trend.78 Therefore, we cannot
conclude that the 1995 reforms had any impact on the percentage of
small settlements.
Table 12 displays some further descriptive statistics for the
small settlement cases. On average, we see that the median values in
small settlement cases are statistically significantly shorter for class
periods, occur at statistically significantly smaller firms, and have
statistically significantly lower provable losses, but exhibit very
similar provable loss ratios (which are not significantly different) than
the median values for cases yielding settlements exceeding $ 3 million.
We infer from this descriptive data that small settlements arise in
small capitalization firms in which there are relatively few injured
investors and, thus, low levels of provable losses. On the other hand,
the resulting settlements appear to recoup roughly the same amount
of investors’ losses as other cases relative to the sum lost by investors.
We caution, however, that these are only descriptive data and that we
need to examine them more completely using a more sophisticated
statistical analysis.

78. Cases with settlements less than $3 million accounted for about thirty-five percent,
twenty-six percent, and thirty-three percent of the total cases settled during the pre-PSLRA, the
early post-PSLRA, and the mature post-PSLRA periods, respectively.
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One final set of descriptive data relates to the time between the
filing of the class action complaint and the settlement of the case. We
hypothesize that strike suits are settled more quickly than
meritorious actions because their value is easier to assess by each
side. We therefore check to see if small settlements occur more rapidly
than larger ones, as a separate indication of whether they are more
likely to be strike suits. Table 13 shows that there are some
differences in settlement speed, with smaller cases settling more
rapidly. Roughly, cases that settle for less than $3 million are
concluded three months earlier than cases yielding larger settlements.
These differences are statistically significant for the median levels,
although not for the means.

We turn next to multivariate regression analysis to see if these
patterns persist once we control for the effects of other variables.
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Table 14 exhibits the results of our analysis for the determinants of
the provable loss ratio—that is, our measure of what percentage of the
investors’ damages is recovered in the settlement. We see that there is
a strong negative significant relationship between the provable loss
ratio and the firm’s total number of employees, our proxy for firm
size. 79 Most importantly, we see that our two dummy variables for
small settlements are both strongly (and significantly) negatively
correlated with the provable loss ratio. We interpret this finding as
consistent with the claim that small settlements recover a lower
percentage of investors’ losses. In short, these small settlement cases
appear to exhibit the characteristics commonly associated with strike
suits: small cash settlements that represent a small percentage of
investors’ damages.
Table 14
Determinants of Log (Ratio of Settlement Amount to Provable Loss)
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient
-1.64

Standard Error
0.25

t - Statistics
-6.67

p - Value
<.0001

Log (Number of Employees)

-0.21

0.03

-6.29**

<.0001

SEC Dummy

0.16

0.17

0.92

0.36

Bankruptcy Dummy

-0.04

0.23

-0.19

0.85

Settlement < $2 Million

-0.37

0.19

-1.94**

0.05

$2 Million <= Settlement < $3 Million
** Significant at 5%.
Adj. R-sq: 0.09
n - 376

-0.48

0.24

-1.96**

0.05

Finally, in an effort to shed some further light on these issues,
we explore the factors that determine when a case will settle for a low
amount. As we expected from the earlier descriptive statistics, higher
levels of provable losses, larger firm size, and longer class periods all
significantly reduce the likelihood of a small settlement. None of the
other explanatory variables in the equation are significant.

79. We used log (number of employees) rather than log (total assets) to proxy for the size of the
defendant corporation because the latter is highly correlated with provable loss and thus gives
rise to the concern about the variable's correlation with the error term. The number of employees
is a reasonable instrument for the size of the defendant corporation and is much less correlated
with provable loss. This weaker correlation plus the usage of a ratio as the dependant variable in
the regression (in which both numerator and denominator are scaled by firm size) eliminates our
concern for any correlation between explanatory variables and the error term.
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These findings are consistent with the claim that cases against
bigger firms with greater losses and longer class periods are less likely
to result in small settlements. Surprisingly, the presence of an
institutional investor, an SEC investigation, or a bankruptcy filing
has no significant effect. In other words, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the presence of an institutional investor lead plaintiff
has no effect on whether a small settlement occurs. This would seem
inconsistent with the claim that institutional lead plaintiffs monitor
settlements and discourage the continuance of strike suits.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the forces propelling the PLSRA’s enactment was the
charge that the merits did not matter in the settlement of securities
class actions.80 This charge was leveled in a widely celebrated article
that examined six settlements that fell in a tight band of twenty to
27.35 percent of the allowable recovery. 81 This claim is not only
debunked here but flatly rejected by other studies that find that
settlements range widely and that the strength of the complaint
matters—likely a lot.82 Equally reassuring is that the law can have its
80. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 514-15 (1991) (finding that the settlement amounts in the
sample cases generally could be predicted knowing only the number of shares sold in the offering
and the stock price at the beginning and end of the class period).
81. Id. at 516-17.
82. See generally Cox, supra note 6, at 503-08 (reviewing some early evidence and studies
that challenge the assertion that settlements are not impacted by the relative merits of the suit).
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intended consequence. The lead plaintiff provision sought to attract
institutions and others who have a significant stake in the litigation to
become the suit’s plaintiff. Our findings not only reflect that nearly
eighteen percent of securities class action settlements in suits
initiated after the PSLRA are prosecuted by institutional plaintiffs of
the type desired by Congress, but also, more importantly, that they
add substantial value to the outcome. Moreover, we find that there is
no important difference in outcome associated with the lead plaintiff
being a public pension fund versus a labor pension fund. Thus,
criticism sometimes levied at the relationship some plaintiff firms
have with labor is not borne out by our data. Finally, our study also
underscores the dramatic impact an SEC enforcement action has on
the dynamics of settlements. If there is cause for disquiet it is that
20.5 percent of our settlements are below $2 million and, when this
group is examined, we find that its median settlement is half that
ceiling level. Equally disturbing is that these cases are settled more
quickly, involve smaller firms, have shorter class action periods, have
significantly lower provable loss, and yield investors a lower recovery
on their provable losses than do larger settlement cases. Our intuition
is that these are cases focused on a single reporting event committed
by what the attorneys believe to be a vulnerable prey: the smaller
capitalized company. Nonetheless, there is cause here to be somewhat
sanguine. Because this set represents only a distinct minority of the
cases, we believe it hardly makes the case for wholesale reform of the
securities class action. We also speculate that recent legal events—
such as the Supreme Court’s further tightening of the pleading
requirement, 83 its requirement that factual pleadings allege that
misrepresentation was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff class suffering a
loss, and its substantial qualification of the class action being
certifiable on the “fraud on the market” theory for causation84—are
likely to have their most profound impact on this cohort of cases. In
this light, the law well may have progressed in a direction to reduce
further the possibility of strike or long-shot suits. If so, our data,
although preceding each of these recent developments, nonetheless

83. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007)
(holding that “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent”).
84. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005) (holding that a mere
allegation that fraud inflated the price at which investors purchased is insufficient to establish
loss causation; there must be an allegation of loss following disclosure of the true facts); In re
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a trial judge,
before certifying a class action premised on a fraud on the market theory of causation, must find
more likely than not that the security traded in a market that was efficient).
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complements the concerns that produce these procedural and
substantive developments, which shape the future course of securities
class actions. In sum, our data and accompanying analysis provide
reassurance that the PSLRA is working and likely working well.

